Abstract. We consider semi-adaptive security for attribute-based encryption, where the adversary specifies the challenge attribute vector after it sees the public parameters but before it makes any secret key queries. We present two constructions of semi-adaptive attribute-based encryption under static assumptions with short ciphertexts. Previous constructions with short ciphertexts either achieve the weaker notion of selective security, or require parameterized assumptions.
Introduction
Attribute-based encryption (ABE) [33, 19] is an emerging paradigm for public-key encryption which enables fine-grained control of access to encrypted data. In traditional public-key encryption, access to the encrypted data is all or nothing: given the secret key, one can decrypt and read the entire plaintext, but without it, nothing about the plaintext is revealed (other than its length). In ABE, a ciphertext is labeled with an attribute vector x, and a secret key is associated with an access policy specified as a Boolean formula, and the secret key decrypts the ciphertext if and only if x satisfies the access policy. 1 It is easy to see that ABE is a generalization of identity-based encryption (IBE) [34, 5, 13] . The security requirement for ABE stipulates that it resists collusion attacks, namely any group of users collectively learns nothing about the plaintext if none of them is individually authorized to decrypt the ciphertext.
Delegation. A delegation scheme allows a computationally weak client to delegate expensive computations to the cloud, with the assurance that a malicious cloud cannot convince the client to accept an incorrect computation [18, 16, 4, 14] . Recent work of Parno, Raykova and Vaikuntanathan [32] showed that any ABE with encryption time at most linear in the length of the attribute vector immediately yields a delegation scheme for Boolean formula. There is an initial pre-processing phase which fixes the formula f the client wishes to compute and produces some public key. Afterwards, to delegate computation on an input x, the client only needs to send a single message. Moreover, the ensuing delegation scheme satisfies public delegatability, namely anyone can delegate computations to the cloud; as well as public verifiability, namely anyone can check the cloud's work (given a "verification" key published by the client).
State of the art. Since the introduction of ABE and motivated in part by the connection to delegation, there is now a large body of work providing constructions with incomparable trade-offs amongst efficiency, security guarantees and security assumptions [19, 2, 27, 31, 26] ; a summary of this work is presented in Fig 1. A key measure of efficiency is the ciphertext size and the encryption time; ideally, we want this to depend at most linearly in the length of the attribute vector and independent of the size of the access structure. For security guarantees, the two primary notions are selective and adaptive security; in the more restrictive setting of selective security, the adversary must specify the challenge attribute vector prior to seeing the public parameters. Finally, the security of the schemes rely on the assumed hardness of some computational problem in bilinear groups; here, we prefer prime-order instantiations over composite-order ones, and static assumptions over parameterized ones.
Our Contributions
We introduce the notion of semi-adaptive security for ABE and delegation. In ABE, this means that the adversary specifies the challenge attribute vector after it sees the public parameters but before it makes any secret key queries. This is stronger than selective security but weaker than adaptive security. In delegation, this means that the client's input may depend on the public key but is independent of the worker's evaluation key. In addition, we provide new constructions of efficient semi-adaptively secure ABE and delegation schemes under static assumptions.
New ABE Schemes. Our first result is a semi-adaptively secure ABE whose efficiency matches the state-ofthe-art selectively secure ABE [2] Fig. 1 . Summary of existing KP-ABE schemes. Here, n denotes the universe size, M is the maximum number of times an attribute may be used, and ℓ ≤ nM is the number of rows in the matrix M of the access structure. Encryption time is given in terms of group operations, and CT, PP, SK sizes are given in terms of group elements. For CT, we omit the additive overhead of n bits in order to transmit the attribute vector. For the quantities marked with * , n may be replaced with number of non-zero entries in the attribute vector x ∈ {0, 1} n , which could be much smaller than n. Note that ALP11, T14 and A14 achieve large universe, we restrict the attribute universe to [n] for comparison.
(Informal Theorem) There exists a semi-adaptively secure ABE with constant-size ciphertexts. Encryption time is linear in the length of the attribute vector and independent of the size of the access structure. The security of the scheme is based on static assumptions in composite-order groups.
We also achieve an analogous result in prime-order groups based on the SXDH Assumption; however, the ciphertext size is linear in the length of the attribute vector. Throughout this work, when we refer to ciphertext size, we measure the number of group elements, and we omit the additive overhead of n bits needed to transmit the attribute vector.
New Delegation Schemes. Starting from our semi-adaptively secure ABE, we obtain improved delegation schemes for Boolean formula with semi-adaptive soundness, where correctness of the computation is guaranteed even if the client's input is chosen adaptively depending on its public key. We note that achieving semi-adaptive soundness is important in practice, since we would like to reuse the same public key across multiple inputs, which could lead to correlation between the input and the public key. Previous delegation schemes for formula achieve one of adaptive soundness [26, 17] , constant communication complexity 2 [2] , or security under static assumptions [19] ; we achieve semi-adaptive soundness and the last two simultaneously. We compare our schemes with prior works in Fig 2. We stress that in applications such as delegating computation from mobile devices on cellular networks where bandwidth is a premium, reducing the client's communication from O(nλ) bits to n + O(λ) bits represents substantial savings.
Our Techniques
Following our recent works [38, 9] and inspired in part by [26] , we rely on Waters' dual system encryption methodology [36, 25] to reduce the problem of building a (public-key) semi-adaptively secure ABE to that of building a private-key selectively secure ABE. Recall that dual system encryption is typically implemented by designing a "semi-functional space" where semi-functional components of keys and ciphertexts will behave like a parallel copy of the normal components of the system, except divorced from the public parameters. In particular, we will embed the private-key selectively secure ABE into the semi-functional space.
We proceed to outline the constructions of private-key ABE with short ciphertexts:
worker's complexity groups assumptions
Summary of existing publicly verifiable computation schemes. GGPR13 supports NC. The remaining schemes only support NC 1 and are obtained using the transformation of [32] . Here, |EK F | is the worker's evaluation key, n is the bit length of the input and ℓ is the size of the formula. In all the schemes, the public key is O(n) group elements, delegation and verification complexity of client is O(n) group operations, computation complexity of worker is also given in terms of group operations.
-For our composite-order scheme with constant-size ciphertext, we use a private-key variant of the selectively secure ABE scheme of Attrapadung, Libert and Panafieu (ALP) in [2] . Our main insight is that in the private-key setting with a single challenge ciphertext, we can replace the use of parameterized assumptions in the ALP scheme with the basic DDH assumption. Roughly speaking, fix an attribute i that does not appear in the challenge attribute. We can then rely on the DDH assumption to mask all the LSSS shares of the master secret key corresponding to attribute i (c.f. Section 3 overview and Lemma 2). 3 The formal security proof is more involved since we need to instantiate this argument within the dual system framework. -For our prime-order scheme with O(n)-size ciphertext, the private-key selectively secure ABE we use is essentially that of Goyal et al. [19] , which is in fact a public-key scheme and yields ciphertexts of length O(n). To combine this scheme with the dual system framework, we rely on dual pairing vector spaces [29, 30, 15, 23, 11] . Here, we will also use the SXDH assumption to boost statistical entropy in the semi-functional key space into arbitrarily large amounts of computational entropy in the same space (c.f. Lemma 6) as we will need to mask an arbitrarily large number of shares corresponding to a single attribute.
For both schemes, we are able to exploit random self-reducibility to obtain security loss that do not depend on the number of secret key queries or the size of the boolean formula (but may depend on the input size n). In contrast, all known adaptively secure ABE schemes incur a loss that is at least linear in both the number of secret key queries and the size of the boolean formula (sometimes implicitly, by either making a "one-use" restriction or using a parameterized assumption).
Additional related work. In an independent work, Takashima [35] proposed a selectively secure KP-ABE scheme with constant-size ciphertexts under the DLIN assumption, which results in a delegation scheme with constant communication complexity and security under static assumptions but only achieving selective soundness. Upon learning of our work, Takashima showed that his scheme also achieves semi-adaptive security, thereby resolving a natural open problem from this work. Gennaro, Gentry, Parno and Raykova [17] constructed a delegation scheme achieving adaptive soundness and supporting NC but its security relies on parameterized assumptions.
Organization. We present our composite-order and prime-order constructions in Section 3 and Section A respectively, and the delegation schemes and associated definitions in Section B.
Preliminaries
Notation. We denote by s ← R S the fact that s is picked uniformly at random from a finite set S and by x, y, z ← R S that all x, y, z are picked independently and uniformly at random from S. By PPT, we denote a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm. Throughout, we use 1 λ as the security parameter. We use · to denote multiplication (or group operation) as well as component-wise multiplication. We use lower case boldface to denote (column) vectors over scalars and upper case boldface to denote vectors of group elements as well as matrices. Given two vectors x = (x 1 , x 2 , . . .), y = (y 1 , y 2 , . . .) over scalars, we use ⟨x, y⟩ to denote the standard dot product x ⊤ y. Given a group element g, we write g x to denote (g x 1 , g x 2 , . . .); we define g A where A is a matrix in an analogous way.
Access Structures
We define (monotone) access structures using the language of (monotone) span programs [21] .
Definition 1 (access structure [3, 21] ). A (monotone) access structure A for attribute universe [n] is a pair 
Observe that the constants {ω j } can be computed in time polynomial in the size of the matrix M via Gaussian elimination.
Key-Policy Attribute-Based Encryption
A KP-ABE scheme consists of four algorithms (Setup, Enc, KeyGen, Dec): 
Semi-Adaptive Security Model
We now formalize the notation of semi-adaptive security for KP-ABE. Briefly, the adversary specifies the challenge attribute vector after it sees the public parameters and before it makes any secret key queries. The security game is defined by the following experiment, played by a challenger and an adversary A. 
Composite Order Bilinear Groups
Composite order bilinear groups were first introduced in [7] and used in [22, 25, 27] . A generator G takes as input a security parameter 1 λ and outputs a description G :
where N is product of distinct primes of Θ(λ) bits, G N and G T are cyclic groups of order N , and e : G N × G N → G T is a map with the following properties:
We require that the group operations in G N and G T as well the bilinear map e are computable in deterministic polynomial time with respect to λ. Furthermore, the group descriptions of G N and G T include generators of the respective cyclic groups. We use G n to denote the subgroup of G N of order n, where n divides N .
Computational Assumptions. We now state the three static assumptions that are required in our security proof. The first two assumptions are introduced in [25] and also used in [27] . The third assumption which basically asserts that the DDH problem is hard in the G p 2 -subgroup. This assumption is essentially implied by the composite 3-party Diffie-Hellman (3PDH) assumption in [6] . We provide more discussion and justification of this assumption in Section C. All three assumptions hold in the generic group model under the assumption finding a non-trivial factor of N is hard.
Assumption 1 Given a group generator G, we define the following distribution:
We assume that for any PPT algorithm A,
is negligible in the security parameter λ.
Assumption 2 Given a group generator G, we define the following distribution:
Assumption 3 Given a group generator G, we define the following distribution:
3 Semi-Adaptive ABE with Constant-Size Ciphertext
Overview. The starting point of our construction is the following variant of the ALP KP-ABE in [2] :
where α 1 , . . . , α ℓ are LSSS shares of α for the access structure A. Our construction proceeds by embedding this scheme into composite-order groups. As noted in the introduction, our main insight is to analyze this scheme in the private-key, selective setting. Fix a selective challenge x * ∈ {0, 1} n and an index k ∈ [n]
and an access structure A not satisfied by x * . We proceed via a case analysis to argue that SK A hides α computationally:
-if x * k = 1, then the shares {α j : ρ(j) = k} reveal no information about α via the secret sharing property. -if x * k = 0, then the ciphertext reveals no information about w k (and since we are in the private-key setting, there is no MPK). Then, by the DDH assumption, {g α j +r j w k , g r j : ρ(j) = k} computationally hides α j .
The formal security proof is more involved since we need to instantiate this argument within the dual system framework.
Construction
-Enc(MPK, x, m) : On input an attribute vector x := (x 1 , . . . , x n ) ∈ {0, 1} n and m ∈ G T , output
where
and (e 1 , . . . , e n ) is the standard basis for
and recover the message
Correctness. Observe that 4 The αj's do in fact correspond to LSSS secret shares of α, distributed across n parties, where the i'th party receive |ρ −1 (i)| shares, given by {αj : ρ(j) = i}. 5 It is easy to see that e(C x 0 , Dj) can in fact be computed using only a single pairing.
In addition, we have
Correctness follows readily.
Proof of Security
We prove the following theorem: 
and
where n is the size of universe attribute set and poly(λ, n) is independent of Time(A).
Overview. The proof follows via a series of games. To describe the games, we must first define semifunctional keys and ciphertexts. Fix random generators g 1 , g 2 , g 3 , and let x * denote the semi-adaptive challenge. We stress that unlike standard dual system encryption, we allow the semi-functional secret keys to depend on the semi-adaptive challenge x * (this is okay because in the semi-adaptive security game, x * is fixed before the adversary sees any secret keys). In the final transition (c.f. Lemma 3), we need to be able to simulate the secret keys given g α 1 X 2 (as provided in Assumption 2) instead of g α 1 , so we define the semi-functional secret keys to have additional random G p 2 -components for the indices j corresponding to x * ρ(j) = 0 as captured by the term α ′ j e ρ(j) below.
Semi-functional ciphertext.
Semi-functional secret key.
-both semi-functional and normal secret key SK A can decrypt a normal ciphertext CT x * ; -a normal secret key SK A can decrypt a semi-functional ciphertext CT x * ; -a semi-functional secret key SK A can decrypt a semi-functional ciphertext CT x * ; this is because the j'th
2 . This is different from a standard dual system encryption argument, but is okay in our setting because x * is fixed semi-adaptively before the adversary makes secret key queries.
Game sequence. We consider the following sequence of games:
-Game 0 : is the real security game (c.f. Section 2.3).
-Game 1 : is the same as Game 0 except that the challenge ciphertext is semi-functional.
-Game 2,k , k = 1, 2, . . . , n: we incrementally transform each normal secret key to a semi-functional one, i.e. Game 2,k is the same as Game 1 except that, for each secret key
) ,
In other words, from Game 2,k−1 to Game 2,k , we modify the first component D j of the j'th subkey for all j such that ρ(j) = k (that is, corresponds to the variable x k ) as follows:
Note that in Game 2,n , all keys are semi-functional.
-Game 3 : is the same as Game 2,n except that the challenge ciphertext is a semi-functional encryption of a random message in G T .
Fix an adversary A. We write Adv xx (λ) to denote the advantage of A in Game xx . It is easy to see that Adv 3 (λ) = 0, because the view of the adversary is Game 3 is independent of the challenge bit β. We complete the proof by establishing the following sequence of lemmas.
Lemma 1 (Normal to semi-functional ciphertext).
There exists an adversary B 1 such that:
Proof. We construct an adversary B 1 for Assumption 1 using A. Recall that in Assumption 1, the adversary is given D := (G; g 1 , U 1 U 2 , g 3 ), along with T , where T is distributed as
The quantity s, s ′ in the assumption will correspond the random exponents s, s ′ used in the ciphertext.
Specifically, B 1 proceeds as follows:
is known to B 1 . The adversary A outputs a challenge x * := (x * 1 , . . . , x * n ).
Challenge Ciphertext. Upon receiving two equal-length messages m 0 and m 1 from A, B 1 picks β ← R {0, 1} and outputs the semi-functional challenge ciphertext as:
, this would indeed be a normal encryption. On the other hand, if s ′ ← R Z N instead, this would indeed be a semi-functional encryption.
Key Queries. On input A := (M, ρ), B 1 needs to generate a normal key SK A , which has the distribution (
) .
2 with (U 1 U 2 )r j ; then, it outputs
Observe that (U 1 U 2 )r j is properly distributed as long as U 1 U 2 is a generator of G p 1 p 2 (by the Chinese Remainder Theorem), which occurs with probability
We may therefore conclude that:
Lemma 2 (Normal to semi-functional keys). For k = 1, . . . , n, there exists an adversary B 2 such that:
Overview of proof. Fix k. We want to modify j'th subkey (D j , D 0,j ) for all j such that ρ(j) = k (that is, corresponds to the variable x k ) as follows:
-if x * k = 1, we leave it unchanged (in this case, Game 2,k−1 and Game 2,k are identical);
using Assumption 3.
In the rest of the overview, we focus on the case x * k = 0. Roughly speaking, we rely on the fact that w k (mod p 2 ) is statistically hidden given MPK to obtain computational entropy as captured by {g
in Game 2,k−1 and Game 2,k are of the form:
Roughly speaking, it suffices to show that:
are computationally indistinguishable, where g w 1 is provided in MPK. We may further simplify this to show that:
This follows essentially from Assumption 3, which tells us that
are computationally indistinguishable, where
Here, we rely crucially on the fact that w k (mod p 2 ) is completely random given g
we can proceed via a hybrid argument, but that would yield a security loss of |ρ −1 (k)|. To avoid this loss, we rely on the rerandomization trick from [28] . Finally, note that we cannot generate a semi-functional ciphertext for x * such that x * k = 1 since we are only given g Proof. We construct an adversary B 2 (which gets as additional input k ∈ [n]) for Assumption 3 using A.
We note that the case x * k = 1 is straight-forward since Game 2,k is identical to Game 2,k−1 , which means
. This leaves us with k such that x * k = 0. Recall that in Assumption 3, the adversary is given D :
Here, we assume that z ← R Z * p 2 , which yields a 1/p 2 negligible difference from Assumption 3 in the advantage; B 2 simulates Game 2,k−1 if T = g xy 2 W 3 and Game 2,k if T = g xy+z 2 W 3 . Moreover, we use a "trick" from [28] to get a tight security reduction and avoid losing a factor of ℓ.
Specifically, B 2 proceeds as follows:
N and implicitly sets the parameter w :=w mod p 1 p 3 (whereas w mod p 2 is undetermined at this point). B 2 outputs
Observe that this is indeed the correct distribution since g w 1 = gw 1 . Moreover, we note that
is known to B 2 . Upon receiving a challenge x * := (x * 1 , . . . , x * n ) for which x * k = 0, B 2 implicitly sets the parameter w =w + y · e k mod p 2 .
Challenge Ciphertext. Upon receiving two equal-length messages m 0 and m 1 from A, B 2 picks β ← R {0, 1} and outputs the semi-functional challenge ciphertext as:
Observe that this is indeed the correct distribution since ⟨w,
Key Queries. On input A := (M, ρ), B 2 needs to generate a secret key SK A of the form:
Note that we know α and can therefore compute α j := M j u as in the normal KeyGen. We proceed via a case analysis for j. The first three cases are straight-forward, observe that
e k .
We simply use g 2 U 3 and g y 2 Y 3 in place of g 2 and g y 2 respectively and pick
This leaves us with j such that (
We can then rewrite the j'th normal subkey as:
Here, we want to replace
3 ), and outputs as the j'th subkey ( g
, this would indeed be a normal subkey. On the other hand, if z ← R Z * p 2 , this would be a semi-functional subkey, with α ′ j := zδ j , and where (r ′ j , δ j ) are pairwise-independent modulo p 2 .
In summary, B 2 outputs as SK
There exists an adversary B 3 such that:
Overview of proof. Following the final transitions in [25, 27] , we use Assumption 2, in which we are given
where T is either e(g 1 , g 1 ) αs or drawn uniformly from G T to blind the challenge message m β . The main challenge in our setting lies in simulating a semi-functional key SK A given g α 1 X 2 and not α itself. Recall that a semi-functional key SK A has the same distribution 
in both Game 2,n and Game 3 . Specifically, we need to simulate (given : x * ρ(j) = 1) by raising g 1 to the power of random LSSS shares of 0 (as determined by Mũ 0 below); -simulate the terms (g
by doing a LSSS share of g α 1 X 2 "in the exponent" (as determined by αMũ 1 below), multiplying by the shares of 0 from the previous step, then re-randomizing the G p 2 -components.
We exploit the fact that x * does not satisfy A to argue that we can chooseũ 1 so that M x * ũ 1 = 0.
Proof. We construct an adversary B 3 for Assumption 2 using A. Recall that in Assumption 2, the adversary is given D := (G;
, along with T , where T equals e(g 1 , g 1 ) αs or is drawn uniformly from G T . Here, B 3 simulates Game 2,n if T := e(g 1 , g 1 ) αs and Game 3 if T ← R G T . The quantity α in the assumption will correspond exactly to α in MSK, and the quantity s in the assumption will correspond the random exponents s used in the (semi-functional) ciphertext.
Specifically, B 3 proceeds as follows:
Setup. B 3 samples w ← R Z n N and output the public parameters
.
We note that
Challenge Ciphertext. Upon receiving two equal-length messages m 0 and m 1 from A, B 3 picks β ← R {0, 1} and outputs the semi-functional challenge ciphertext as:
Now, if T is distributed as distributed as e(g 1 , g 1 ) αs , this would indeed be a properly distributed semifunctional encryption of m β . On the other hand, if T ← R G T , instead, then the challenge ciphertext is a properly distributed semi-functional encryption of a random message in G T .
Key Queries. On input A := (M, ρ), B 3 needs to generate a semi-functional key SK A , which has the distribution
The main challenge lies in simulating the terms g Observe that u has indeed the correct distribution. Recall that we set α j := M j u, which yields
ρ(j) = 0 where bothũ 1 andũ 0 are known to B 3 . The case j such that x * ρ(j) = 1 is straight-forward; B 3 simply picks r j , r ′ j ← R Z N . For the case j such that x * ρ(j) = 0, we can then rewrite g
2 as a function of u 0 ,ũ 1 , and g α 1 X 2 :
where B 3 picksα ′ j ← R Z N and implicitly sets g
A Semi-Adaptive ABE in Prime-Order Groups
This is based on embedding the ABE scheme of Goyal et al. [19] (see also [27] ).
A.1 Dual Pairing Vector Spaces
Our second construction is based on dual pairing vector spaces proposed by Okamoto and Takashima [29, 30] . In this paper, we concentrate on the asymmetric version [31] . We only briefly describe how to generate random dual orthonormal bases. See [29, 30, 31] for a full definition of dual pairing vector spaces. We first introduce asymmetric bilinear pairing groups. A generator G which takes as input a security parameter 1 λ and outputs a description G := (q, G 1 , G 2 , G T , e) , where q is a prime of Θ(λ) bits, G 1 , G 2 , and G T are cyclic groups of order q, and e : G 1 × G 2 → G T is a map with the following properties:
We require that the group operations in G 1 , G 2 , and G T as well the bilinear map e are computable in deterministic polynomial time with respect to λ. Furthermore, the group descriptions of G 1 , G 2 , and G T include generators of the respective cyclic groups.
We extend the pairing e to vectors of group elements over G 1 and G 2 by defining
Dual Pairing Vector Spaces. For a fixed (constant) dimension n, we will choose random bases
q , subject to the constraint that they are "dual orthonormal", meaning that ⟨d * i , d j ⟩ = 0 mod q whenever i ̸ = j, and
We denote such algorithm as
Then for generators g 1 ∈ G 1 and g 2 ∈ G 2 , we have
2 ) = 1 whenever i ̸ = j, where 1 here denotes the identity element in G T .
Computational Assumptions. We now state the decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) and Subspace assumptions that are required in our security proof. We stress that all these assumptions hold under the symmetric external Diffie-Hellman (SXDH) assumption is hard.
Assumption 4 (DDH1: Decisional Diffie-Hellman Assumption in G 1 ) Given a group generator G, we define the following distribution:
. We assume that for any PPT algorithm A (with output in {0, 1}),
The dual of above assumption is decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption in G 2 (denoted as DDH2), which is identical to Definitions 4 with the roles of G 1 and G 2 reversed. We say that: The Subspace assumptions were introduced in [23, 11, 31] . In this paper, specifically, we require the following Subspace assumption in G 1 , which is similar with the SXDH-based Subspace assumptions of [11] but involves n + 1 bases pairs chosen independently at random (see also [24] ).
Assumption 5 (DS1: Decisional Subspace Assumption in G 1 ) Given a group generator G(·), define the following distribution:
We assume that for any PPT algorithm A (with output in {0, 1}), 
and Time(B) ≈ Time(A) + poly(λ, n) where poly(λ, n) is independent of Time(A).
The proof of above lemma is essentially the same as given in [11] , but for completeness, we include a proof in Section D.
A.2 Construction
and MSK := ( α, ζ, g
Enc(MPK, x, m): On input an attribute vector x ∈ {0, 1} n and m ∈ G T , output
where s ← R Z q . 
KeyGen(MPK,
Then, compute
and recover the message as m ← C n+1 /e(g 1 , g 2 ) αs ∈ G T .
Correctness. Observe that
In addition, we have ∑
This means ∏
A.3 Proof of Security
where poly(λ, n) is independent of Time(A).
The proof follows via a series of games. To describe the games, we must first define semi-functional keys and ciphertexts. Fix random generators g 1 , g 2 , and let x * denote the semi-adaptive challenge.
where fresh α ′ 1 , . . . , α ′ ℓ ← R Z q are chosen for each secret key.
Game Sequence. We consider the following sequence of games:
-Game 2 : is the same as Game 1 except that all keys are semi-functional. (This step is simpler than the corresponding transition in the composite-order setting.)
-Game 3 : is the same as Game 2 except that the challenge ciphertext is a semi-functional encryption of a random message in G T .
Fix an adversary A. We write Adv x (λ) to denote the advantage of A in Game x . It is easy to see that Adv 3 (λ) = 0, because the view of the adversary is Game 3 is independent of the challenge bit β. We complete the proof by establishing the following sequence of lemmas.
Lemma 5 (Normal to semi-functional ciphertext).
and Time(B 1 ) ≈ Time(A) + q · poly(λ, n) where poly(λ, n) is independent of Time(A).
Proof. We construct an adversary B 1 for Subspace assumption in G 1 using A. Recall that in Subspace assumption in G 1 , the adversary is given Here, B 1 simulates Game 0 if T 0 , . . . , T n are distributed as the former and Game 1 if T 0 , . . . , T n are distributed as the latter. We have named the exponents in the Assumption so that the quantity α, ζ in the assumption will correspond exactly to α, ζ in MSK, and the quantity s, s ′ in the assumption will correspond the random exponents s, s ′ used in the (semi-functional) ciphertext. Specifically, B 1 proceeds as follows:
, this would indeed be a normal encryption. On the other hand, if s ′ ← R Z q instead, this would indeed be a semi-functional encryption.
The main challenge lies in simulating the term g
. We begin with the remaining terms.
which are distributed as:
where r j , r ′ j ← R Z q . Namely, pickr j ,r ′ j ← R Z q , and output
This allows us to rewrite SK A as: (
) . Now, we just have to simulate the term g
. To do this, B 1 picks u,ṽ ∈ Z ℓ ′ q such that 1ũ = 0 and 1ṽ = 1, and implicitly sets u := αṽ +ũ and v := ζṽ.
Observe that u, v have indeed the correct distributions. Recall that we set α j := M j u and ζ j := M j v, which means α j = α · M jṽ + M jũ and ζ j = ζ · M jṽ , and thus
We can then rewrite g
as a function ofũ,ṽ and U ρ(j) . That is, B 1 simply outputs:
) , which would indeed be a normal secret key.
Lemma 6 (Normal to semi-functional keys). There exists an adversary B 2 whose running time is essentially the same as that of A such that:
and Time(B 2 ) ≈ Time(A) + q · poly(λ, n) where poly(λ, n) is independent of Time(A).
Proof. We construct an adversary B 2 for DDH assumption in G 2 using A. Recall that in DDH assumption in G 2 , the adversary is given D := (G; . Here, we assume that y, z ← R Z * p 2 , which yields a 2/q negligible difference in the advantage; B 2 simulates
. Moreover, we note that
Challenge Attribute. Upon receiving a challenge x * := (x * 1 , . . . , x * n ) where x * k = 0, B 2 implicitly sets the parameters
Note that all the bases are properly distributed.
Note that we know α, ζ and can therefore compute α j := M j u, ζ j := M j v as in the normal KeyGen.
We proceed via a case analysis for j. The case x * ρ(j) = 1 is straight-forward; we know g
. This leaves us with j such that x * ρ(j) = 0. Here, B 2 picks δ j , δ ′ j ← R Z q and implicitly sets
Here, we want to replace g xy 2 with T . B 2 outputs as the j'th subkey ( g
. Then,
where B 2 implicitly sets α ′ j := zy −1 δ j . Now, if z = 0 (i.e., T = g xy 2 ), this would indeed be a normal subkey. On the other hand, if z ← R Z * q , this would be a semi-functional subkey, and where (r ′ j , α ′ j ) are pairwise-independent. In summary, B 2 outputs
Lemma 7 (Final transition).
For any adversary A:
Proof. To prove this lemma, it suffices to show that ζ is completely random, even given all of the semifunctional keys in Game 2 . This would mean that the exponent ζs ′ in the semi-functional ciphertext is distributed as a random value in Z q (if s ′ ̸ = 0). This would in turn imply that challenge ciphertext in Game 2 is statistically close to a semi-functional encryption of a random message in G T . For each key query A := (M, ρ), a semi-functional key has the distribution:
where fresh α ′ 1 , . . . , α ′ ℓ ← R Z q are chosen for each secret key. It suffices to show that the subkeys corresponding to x * ρ(j) = 1 do not reveal any information about ζ, since the share ζ j in the remaining subkeys are completely masked by α ′ j . By definition of the KP-ABE security game, x * does not satisfy A, so 1 / ∈ span⟨M x * ⟩. (Refer to Definition 1 for the notation.) Therefore, we can efficiently computeṽ 1 ∈ Z ℓ ′ q such that M x * ṽ 1 = 0 and 1ṽ 1 = 1.
Next, we sampleṽ 0 ← R Z ℓ ′ q such that 1ṽ 0 = 0, and implicitly set v := ζ ·ṽ 1 +ṽ 0 .
Observe that v has indeed the correct distribution. Recall that we set ζ j := M j v, which yields
This means that the subkeys ( g
reveal no information about ζ since the distribution ofṽ 0 is independent of ζ. Hence, ζ is statistically hidden for the semi-functional key SK A . Therefore, Game 2 and Game 3 are statistically indistinguishable except with probability 1/q (namely, the case s ′ = 0). We may then conclude that:
B Publicly Verifiable Computation
As an application, we obtain improved publicly verifiable delegation schemes for Boolean formula with semi-adaptive soundness, where correctness of the computation is guaranteed even if the client's input is chosen adaptively depending on its public key. Most of the definitions here are taken almost verbatim from [32] .
B.1 Definition for Publicly Verifiable Computation
Definition 4 (Publicly Verifiable Computation [32, 16] , F) , any x ∈ Domain(F), any (σ x , VK F ) ← ProbGen(PK F , x), and any σ out ← Compute(EK F , σ x )), the verification algorithm Verify on input VK x and σ out outputs y = F(x).
B.2 Security for Publicly Verifiable Computation
There are three notions of security (soundness) for publicly verifiable computation, depending on the level of adaptivity the client has in choosing the instance x * with respect to PK F and EK F :
-the weakest notion requires that x * be chosen independently of PK F , EK F . This is the notion achieved in [32] based on the GPSW KP-ABE. -an intermediate notion (introduced in this work) requires that x * by chosen independently of EK F , but may potentially depend on PK F . -the strongest notion allows x * to depend on both PK F and EK F .
We remind the reader PK F is public and reused over computation on many instances. For this reason, we believe that it is important that we allow client's input x * to depend on PK F in order to achieve any meaningful notion of security. On the other hand, EK F is only known to the server carrying out the computation; as such, it seems reasonable to consider relaxed scenarios where the client's input does not depend on the server's private evaluation key EK F . Indeed, both of these are captured in the intermediate notion, which we formalize in the next paragraph.
Semi-adaptive soundness. Let a publicly verifiable computation scheme be for a class of functions F, and let A = (A 1 , A 2 ) be a stateful adversary. Consider the experiment Exp p(n, λ) ).
B.4 Publicly Verifiable Computation from KP-ABE
We recall the Main Theorem and the construction of a publicly verifiable computation protocol from a KP-ABE scheme from [32] . In the remaining of this section, we will use the notion of Boolean function (implemented by a family of circuits C), which is equivalent to access structure in KP-ABE schemes. In fact, it is sufficient for the KP-ABE to be secure against an adversary that only requests for a single secret key. For completeness, we present the publicly verifiable computation protocol from [32] . Let (ABE.Setup, ABE.KeyGen, ABE.Enc, ABE.Dec) be four algorithms of a KP-ABE scheme for the class of functions F ∪F, then the publicly verifiable computation protocol consisting of four algorithms (Setup, ProbGen, Compute, Verify) for F works as follows:
On input a function F ∈ F with input length n, run the KP-ABE setup algorithm twice, to generate two independent key-pairs Output the public key PK F := (MPK 0 , MPK 1 ) and the evaluation key EK F := (SKF, SK F ).
-ProbGen(PK F , x): On input x and the public key PK F , sample two uniformly messages m 0 and m 1 of equal length from the message space, compute the ciphertexts CT x,0 ← ABE.Enc(MPK 0 , x, m 0 ) and CT x,1 ← ABE.Enc (MPK 1 , x, m 1 ).
Output the value σ x := (CT x,0 , CT x,1 ) (to be sent to the worker), and the verification key VK x := (H(m 0 ), H(m 1 )), where H is the one-way function.
-Compute(EK F , σ x ): On input the value σ x := (CT x,0 , CT x,1 ) and the evaluation key
In this section, we provide more discussion on Assumption 3. We first show that Assumption 3 is implied by the following assumption, which is essentially the 3PDH assumption from [6] except that we consider three (instead of two) subgroups. Assumption 6 (3PDH: Composite 3-party Diffie-Hellman Assumption) Given a group generator G, we define the following distribution:
We assume that for any PPT algorithm A, The lemma then follows readily.
⊓ ⊔
Next, we prove that Assumption 3 holds in the generic group model. Instead of working directly with Assumption 3, we introduce Assumption 7, which is simpler to state and trivially implies Assumption 3, and then show that Assumption 7 holds in the generic group model. Proof. We appeal to the general framework introduced in [22, Theorem A.2] for proving assumptions in the generic group model. In the framework, Assumption 7 may be written as: We have S := {i | e(T 0 , A i ) ̸ = e(T 1 , A i )} = {2, 4, 5}. We need to verify that the following conditions holds:
1. Each of T 0 and T 1 is independent of {A i }. Here, we omit all [0, 0, 0] terms. We need to verify the following three statements: Observe that each of these three tuples are independent of the other two tuples. Moreover, they are independent of the {e(A i , A j )} terms, since the latter do not contain a Z-term. We conclude that Assumption 7 holds in the generic group model. ⊓ ⊔
For k ∈ S it holds that e(T
-
D Proof of Lemma 4
We assume there exists a PPT algorithm A breaking the Subspace assumption with non-negligible advantage Adv 
